On Tuesday, the "Independent" Police Conduct Authority issued an extraordinary report, proposing a complete rewrite of protest law to enable the police to restrict public protests and ban them at a whim. While packaged with several complaints in an appendix, the focus of the "thematic review" was clearly the provision of policy advice - something arguably outside the IPCA's functions. It is normal for other agencies providing policy advice to provide supporting documentation - submissions, briefings, communications, policy documents, and so on - either proactively or via the Official Information Act, so that the public can see that it is well-founded, that all relevant stakeholders have been consulted, and that the policy process has not been captured by any one group.
The problem of course is that the IPCA is exempt from the OIA. Nevertheless, I asked them to provide this information to give the reassurance we deserve in a free and democratic society that they were doing their job properly. They refused, saying
To support our work, our Act contains secrecy provisions and our proceedings and any evidence given to us are privileged. We do not collect statistics about the affiliations of our complainants or submitters and we are not able to release any of the information you request.
Those
secrecy provisions however do enable the authority to disclose "such matters as in the opinion of the Authority ought to be disclosed... in order to establish grounds for the Authority’s conclusions and recommendations". The authority's refusal to do so in this case can only lead to the conclusion that they do not believe we ought (or deserve) to know the full basis for their policy advice. That they should be able to recommend significant law changes, while keeping the evidentiary basis (and supporting submissions, briefings, arguments, and testing of their conclusions) completely secret. And that is simply unacceptable in a free and democratic society.
The IPCA's exemption from the OIA has long been noted as anomalous. Its secrecy provisions exist to ensure that complaints can be heard in confidence - an interest already protected by the OIA, and which is protected in other ways for other complaints bodies otherwise subject to the Act. But as long as it stuck to its functions - hearing complaints - that didn't matter so much. Now it is giving significant policy advice, it is a different story. Complaints bodies have a case for limited secrecy around that function. But the idea that government agencies can develop policy in total secrecy is simply monstrous, and incompatible with a free and democratic society. It is precisely the problem that the OIA was enacted to solve.
Rather than rewriting protest law, I think it is time we rewrote the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988. That rewrite must include a complete reassessment of IPCA secrecy, a narrowing of it to protect only the legitimate complaint functions, and the inclusion of the IPCA under the OIA - enabling us to properly scrutinise its administrative and policy work, as well as abstract statistical data on its complaints and outcomes. This would give us much-needed transparency over the IPCA, enabling us to better hold them - and through them, the police - to account.
The alternative is that the IPCA continues to be above the law and effectively unaccountable. The implications for its legitimacy and social licence - and those of the police they supposedly oversee - are left as an exercise for the reader.